

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

THE UNIVERSITY,
OF MICHIGAN

ENDC/PV.103
27 February 1963
ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND THIRD MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Wednesday, 27 February 1963, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. J.B. GODBER

(United Kingdom)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A.A. de MELO FRANCO
Mr. R.L. ASSUMPCAO de ARAUJO
Mr. FRANK da COSTA

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV
Mr. G. GUELEV
Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV
Mr. V. ISMIRLIEV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON
U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. S.F. RAE
Mr. J.E.G. HARDY
Mr. A.E. GOTTLIEB
Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. K. KURKA
Mr. V. PECHOTA
Mr. V. VAJNAR
Mr. A. MIKULIN

Ethiopia:

Lij Mikael LERU
Ato M. HAMID
Ato M. GHEBEYEHU

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL
Mr. A.S. MEHTA
Mr. S.B. DESHKAR

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. A. CAVAGLIERI
Mr. C. COSTA-REGHINI
Mr. P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO
Miss E. AGUIRRE
Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:

Mr. M.T. MBU
Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI
Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI
Mr. W. WIECZOREK

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU
Mr. E. GLASER
Mr. S. SERBANESCU
Mr. A. COROLIANU

Sweden:

Baron C.H. von PLATEN
Mr. S. LÖFGREN
Mr. U. ERICSSON
Mr. E. CORNELL

Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN
Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
Mr. I.G. USACHEV
Mr. P.F. SHAKHOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN
Mr. S. AHMED
Mr. M. KASSEM
Mr. S.E. IBRAHIM

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Mr. J.B. GODBAR
Sir Paul MASON
Mr. J.G. THOURDIN
Mr. D.N. BRIMSON

United States of America:

Mr. W.C. FOSTER
Mr. C.C. STELLIE
Mr. D.E. MARK
Mr. V. BAKER

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. O. LOUTFI

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. M.A. VELLODI

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): I declare open the one hundred and third plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. CAVALIETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I should like to start today with two quotations from the United Kingdom representative, Sir Paul Mason, who in addressing this Committee for the first time last Monday made an important contribution to our debate. He said:

"I urge most respectfully that we should agree, all of us, to study from now on seriously and in depth the various suggestions which may be put forward not only on numbers" - presumably the number of inspections - "but on all aspects of a nuclear test ban agreement". (ENDC/PV.102, p.13)

A little later Sir Paul Mason said:

"I hope that we shall all agree to start on this task - or, if you prefer, to continue it - seriously, in depth and in the round, and to do so without any avoidable delay." (ibid.)

If I have correctly understood the import of the United Kingdom representative's remarks, Sir Paul Mason wished to make a fresh appeal to our Conference to study in depth and without delay all problems referring to the prohibition of tests. There are, as we are only too well aware, certain problems which constitute at present the main obstacles to our negotiations: the number of inspections, and the number of automatic stations. There are, however, many other problems which also deserve immediate examination if the background of an agreement is to be ready when the time comes, as we all hope it will, when the major difficulties have been overcome. That would be a normal procedure for negotiations, since it is useful to isolate the most difficult points and to work round them with a view to finding common ground which, once established, will facilitate the solution of the main problems.

My delegation mentioned and advocated this system in a previous statement. We were encouraged in so doing by the statements of the delegations of the Western nuclear Powers and those of the non-aligned countries, from which a series of questions emerged, forming in my view an agenda which, if not complete, is at any rate sufficiently comprehensive for the work of the Nuclear Sub-Committee. That is why I asked for the immediate convening of the Nuclear Sub-Committee. But the Soviet co-Chairman could not see his way to agreeing to this, and showed a preference for continuing the discussion of tests in plenary session (ENDC/PV.101, p.34). We can but bow to his will. I feel, therefore, that we must try to make our plenary debates as constructive and as practical as possible.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

I have re-read with great care all the speeches made by the various delegations at recent meetings, and I have taken the liberty of extracting a series of questions which have been raised by one or another of these delegations. These are questions which the delegations have indicated as worthy of study in depth, independently of the solution of the two main controversial issues - the number of inspections and the number of "black boxes"

I should like to submit this list to the consideration of the Committee, emphasizing at the same time the two following points. First, the formulation of the problems contained in my list is purely indicative. If this list were to be adopted for consideration, it would need further elaboration, with the assistance in particular of the delegations which first raised the various problems, so that it could be made more precise and detailed. Secondly, it makes no claims to finality or completeness. I know that there are certainly other problems which deserve to be added.

Here, then, with your permission, Mr. Chairman, is the list:

A. National control posts

- (1) National stations which should be made available for purposes of verification;
- (2) Siting of these stations, and possible setting up of other stations, in the territory of parties to the treaty or in other countries;
- (3) Equipment of each control station;
- (4) System for the transmission to the international commission of data obtained by the stations;
- (5) Possible standardization of methods and structures on the pattern, if necessary, of model stations;
- (6) System to be adopted to ensure that the staffs of these stations receive standardized and identical training.

B. Automatic stations

- (1) Instruments which should be contained in each automatic station;
- (2) Siting of stations so as to ensure the most efficient control;
- (3) Practical methods to be employed for installing a station;
- (4) Measures to be adopted for the periodical collection of the data recorded by each station;
- (5) Co-ordination between automatic and other stations;
- (6) Range of each automatic station.

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C. Inspections

- (1) Definition of the size of the zone to be inspected;
- (2) Composition of the inspection team, specially with regard to the nationality and scientific training of the inspectors;
- (3) Operations which the inspectors could and should carry out;
- (4) System of ensuring immediate inspection of a suspicious event;
- (5) Rules of travel for inspectors so as to provide the inspected country with full guarantees against espionage and undue interference with its national life.

D. Central Control Commission

- (1) Possible interim tasks of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, and its appropriate composition;
- (2) Eventual composition of the control commission so as to give the necessary guarantees to the governments concerned;
- (3) Seat of the commission;
- (4) Functions of the commission: analysis and evaluation of data received from the stations, standardized training for station and inspection staff;
- (5) Relations with UN and Member countries;
- (6) Financial contributions.

I do not think that the questions contained in this list require any explanation from me at this stage, since they have been extracted from the clear and detailed statements of my colleagues as recorded in the verbatim reports of previous meetings. I have tried to reflect my colleagues' views as faithfully as possible.

There is just one point which I have taken the liberty of adding and about which I should like to make a few brief comments. I refer to point D(1), the possible interim tasks of the Eighteen-Nation Committee. My colleagues will probably remember that my delegation raised this question in a statement at our opening meeting last November. I said then (ENDC/PV.83, p.44) that, if we managed to reach agreement quickly on certain disarmament measures, we might then be hampered or delayed by the absence of an executive organ.

I also pointed out that the Eighteen-Nation Committee had a well-balanced composition and that, owing to its rules of procedure, it could perhaps come to our aid temporarily so as to enable any agreed measures to be applied immediately. I wanted to mention that possibility, within the framework of an agreement on tests, as an idea which might be considered in order to avoid any delay in the application of a test-ban treaty once agreement had been reached on the main points.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

In conclusion, I should like to be sure that I have made my line of thought quite clear. I do not underestimate the major difficulties which unfortunately still divide us, and I have no intention of trying to impose an agenda on this Committee. My only desire is for a solid and practical foundation to be laid, so that serious discussion of all matters that can and must be discussed here can take place without delay.

It is for this reason that I have suggested that the Conference might care to follow the list of questions which I have just read out, and to subject each question to a thorough examination in order to draw up an agreed text on each. However, any other list or other procedure would be acceptable to me provided we set to work in a constructive manner so as to rid ourselves as soon as possible, through our agreements, of the danger of nuclear tests.

I am even more convinced of the need to adopt such a procedure as a result of the statement made by the United States representative on 25 February (ENDC/PV.102, pp.21 et seq.). The importance of this statement has, I am sure, escaped no one. It opens up new and extremely encouraging prospects for our negotiations. The United States representative not only confirmed the flexibility of his Government's position by reaffirming that the solution of the major problems depends also on the solution adopted for other related problems. He also gave new, clear and practical proof of the United States Government's good will and of the desire of the United States to reach an agreement through mutual concessions.

I believe that it is by that twofold, parallel, effort that we shall attain our goal. On the one hand, it is necessary to tackle the most serious difficulties with a flexible spirit of understanding; and on the other hand we must prepare without delay from now on the solution of all the other problems which also are part of our task. Their solution is important, not only in itself but because it will help us to bring closer our positions on the points which are still the most controversial.

Mr. de MELO FRANCO (Brazil) (translation from French): Allow me before beginning my statement to extend a welcome on behalf of the Brazilian delegation to our colleague Mr. Barrington, representative of Burma.

I should also like to emphasize the interest with which I have listened to the very clear and brilliant statement which Mr. Cavalletti, the representative of Italy, has just made. I particularly appreciated the list of subjects for discussion which he put forward. That is a very constructive contribution, particularly with regard

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to the task which he envisages for our Committee during an interim period, if we were able to reach agreement on nuclear tests. I am sure that the whole Conference will study most carefully the suggestions which our distinguished colleague has put forward. I believe that the two Co-Chairmen will give them the most careful consideration.

Our Conference is continuing to go thoroughly into the question of the cessation of nuclear tests. It is true that this question has forced itself upon the attention of the delegations by its urgency. Even had we desired to give priority in our discussions to other important problems, it would have been difficult for the Conference to divert its interest temporarily from the question of tests, for, as the proverb says, "If you pitch Nature out through the window, it comes back through the door". The problem of nuclear tests is forced upon us at the start, for the very simple reason that progress in the negotiations for a test ban is a necessary step forward in negotiations on general disarmament. No doubt the latter is our final and principal aim, but it can neither be achieved nor even seriously discussed without a previous agreement on nuclear tests. Hence the Conference's unanimous decision to continue the debate on the subject. In this connexion, I should like to recall Mr. Kuznetsov's words at our meeting on 22 February:

"In the statements of all the representatives in the Committee, great attention has been paid to the question of the cessation of nuclear tests."

(ENDC/PV.101. p.34)

The delegation of Brazil will therefore continue the discussion of this important question. While convinced that all the Conference's work now depends upon progress in the matter of tests, it cannot but note with some concern the unfavourable turn which our conversations at Geneva have taken during this phase of our work. The exchange of letters between the Heads of Government of the United States and the Soviet Union (ENDC/73.74) and the tripartite conversations in Washington and New York had given rise to considerable hopes. Regrettably these favourable signs have received no confirmation, at least up to the present.

The representatives of the two Powers principally affected have not concealed their own concern at this fact. At the meeting of 22 February Mr. Kuznetsov stated:

"... we are, unfortunately, unable to speak of any real progress in the negotiations. On the contrary, there are reasons to fear, as some representatives have rightly pointed out, that the favourable opportunity for reaching agreement may be lost." (ENDC/PV.101, p.20)

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Mr. Foster, for his part, echoed this remark in the following passage of his speech of 25 February:

"... I felt compelled to ask myself how we can find any way to overcome the obstacles, both substantive and procedural ..." (ENDC/FV.102, p.22)

The difficulties appear even more serious when we note that each side considers that the other is putting pressure upon it incompatible with its freedom of discussion. In fact, Mr. Kuznetsov said that the Western demands bear the appearance of an ultimatum and could be interpreted in the following way:

"... accept our new conditions, agree to increase the number of inspections and automatic stations, or else there will be no agreement." (ENDC/FV.101, p.28)

In his turn Mr. Foster stated:

"The Soviet figures were offered on a "take it or leave it" basis; and, indeed, in one scarcely-veiled passage, Mr. Kuznetsov said that, unless the West took up the present Soviet offer quickly, it might be withdrawn."

(ENDC/FV.102, p.22)

As will be seen, these expressions of pessimism and mutual complaints of pressure by the two chief nuclear Powers are likely to cause apprehension in the mind of a delegation like ours, which is imbued with a sincere spirit of co-operation, armed with patience, and conscious of the responsibilities deriving from the important task which has been entrusted to us all by the General Assembly of the United Nations.

On the basis of these observations we have attempted in all good faith to clarify the situation as it appears from the facts which have emerged from our discussion up to the present. We have come to the conclusion that the points of disagreement, though apparently irreducible, are in fact of little weight, and that their real gravity is derived precisely from the fact that they are irreducible. In other words, the delegation of Brazil believes that the points of disagreement between the parties are serious because they are irreducible, but not irreducible because they are serious. Let us consider this further.

Let us start with the positions which have been taken up concerning the form of negotiations on tests. Here the disagreement turns on the following points. The American case is that, in the absence of an agreement on the number of inspections, we must begin by discussing the forms of inspection. In the Soviet view, agreement on the number of inspections must precede discussion of their organization.

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Mr. Kuznetsov has explained very clearly the reasons for which his delegation refuses to discuss the organization of inspections before their number. He said:

"Nevertheless, many years of negotiation in this regard have taught us all to be cautious of proposals to deal with technical questions while the basic questions remain unsolved. On many occasions in the past, international negotiations have ended in failure because, instead of dealing with the basic questions, the participants began to deal with secondary questions and, of course, got stuck in them". (ENDC/PV.101, p.31)

However, on this occasion the delegation of Brazil considers that the discussion of technical details is directly linked with the question of the number of inspections, and that is something new. The solution of one of these questions necessarily depends upon the solution of the other, and the cessation of tests depends on both of them. Therefore, if the two sides are resolved to put a speedy end to nuclear tests, neither of them can hold up indefinitely the discussion of either of these two points. The question is not really whether it was the hen or the egg that existed first; that question does not interest us. We want neither the hen nor the egg, so we do not care which came first.

Moreover, considering that the Conference appears to have agreed to discuss the question of tests in plenary session after the end of the general debate, and even before the resumption of the meetings of the three-Power Sub-Committee, it would perhaps be possible for the plenary Conference to consider alternately the question of the number of inspections and automatic seismic stations, and the question of the organization of inspections and the operation of the stations. Thus two parallel but not simultaneous lines of discussion would be established. Moreover, this system could of course be adopted also for private talks between the nuclear Powers.

We note incidentally that these conversations are continuing - as Mr. Foster, the United States representative, gave us to understand on 25 February (ENDC/PV.102, p.24) - in spite of the interruption of the work of the three-Power Sub-Committee. My delegation considers that at present such conversations constitute the best protection against a paralysis of the whole Conference. On this subject I should like to give my full support to the remark of Mrs. Myrdal, the Swedish representative, on the importance of private negotiations outside the framework of the Conference between the Governments of the nuclear Powers (ENDC/PV.100, p.23). Such direct negotiations between governments appear more important than ever at this paradoxical moment when our Conference is passing through a phase of great opportunities and of

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great risks. My delegation hopes that the relative slowing-down of our work will be accompanied by an intensification of diplomatic discussions outside Geneva.

Although it will be difficult and painful, I must now turn to the question of numbers, particularly in connexion with inspections. Public opinion - and I think that here I can speak generally and not only for Brazil - which is following our work from a distance but with anxiety, finds it incomprehensible and even absurd that a few figures relating to journeys by technicians and scientists should be weighed in the diplomatic balance with the same precautions and the same care as dangerous poisons are weighed in the delicate balances of chemists. We, however, who have been participating in this Conference's work for some time know the series of technical, scientific and psychological factors which come into play when we approach this vexed question.

It is true that the United States representative described as without importance - "somewhat irrelevant" was the expression he used on 25 February (ENDC/PV.102, p.23) - the number of inspections. But he explained that this was so only if the question of numbers could be decided at the same time as the question of the organization of the inspections - that is to say, if the solution of the problem of tests was taken as a whole. You yourself, Mr. Chairman, particularly in one of your excellent speeches (ENDC/PV.98, pp. 42 et seq), have given us an idea of the complexity and the delicacy of the problems caused by such an apparently small difference in figures.

The question of the number of on-site inspections and automatic detection stations has been discussed from the point of view not only of its actual content but also from that of its significance. Various interesting arguments have even been exchanged between the two sides, sometimes emphasizing the mainly technical implications of a decision on numbers, and sometimes insisting upon its political nature.

The Brazilian delegation regards this problem as both technical and political. We express that opinion not simply on account of our legitimate desire to eliminate controversy, but because the dual nature of the problem is apparent from the actual development of the debate. Moreover, we believe that the two sides have finally come to share this opinion, since on the socialist side we find a recognition of the technical importance of control, and on the Western side a recognition of its political importance. Indeed, the leader of the United States delegation has stated:

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"Accordingly, we too took an important decision of principle: without waiting to hear the Soviet position on other aspects of a verification system, we decided to specify a new figure for an on-site inspection quota." (ENDC/PV.102, pp. 23, 24)

Thus the specification of a new figure is the outcome of a decision of principle and therefore of a political decision. We must also recognize that on the Soviet side the arguments tend to demonstrate the importance of the technical aspects of control. Since last year the Soviet delegation has been insisting energetically on the possibility of verification by means of national systems of detection, and on the security which would be afforded by a treaty based solely on this national form of control, which in turn is based upon technical installations. Recently the Soviet Government, in a praiseworthy effort of co-operation, accepted the international character of verification, but hardly for political reasons, since in its view scientific techniques rendered such an arrangement unnecessary. If the Soviet Union upholds such points of view, it clearly attaches great importance to the technical and scientific aspects of control, since it considers that they constitute in themselves a sufficient guarantee for the treaty which we all desire.

Therefore we affirm once more that it is not unduly optimistic to say that too much controversy on the technical or political character of control would be useless, since both sides recognize the double character of the problem.

Just now we referred to the importance of the concession of principle made by the Soviet delegation in accepting a system of international inspection which it considers useless. In this connexion Mr. Hassan, the representative of the United Arab Republic, in a speech which rightly produced a profound impression, made the following statement, to which we give our support:

"We still think, therefore, that the Soviet offer must be the object of real appreciation on the part of the two Western partners, who should be able to match it, in token of their appreciation, by a similar spirit on their part."

(ENDC/PV.99, p.11)

The United States representative replied to this remark in that passage of his statement of 25 February which we have just quoted, and in which he emphasizes the political character of the concession reducing the number of inspections required. We cannot deny the political aspect thus emphasized by Mr. Foster.

(Mr. de Molo Franco, Brazil)

Thus we recognize - at least as far as the Brazilian delegation is concerned - that political concessions have been made on both sides. What is required now is to continue the negotiations, having in view not only the technical aspects but also, when necessary, fresh political concessions. In this connexion I was much impressed by the following statement by Mr. Kuznetsov:

"The number of on-site inspections and automatic seismic stations is not a subject for bargaining." (ENDC/PV.101, p.24)

This impression does not prevent me from agreeing with Mr. Kuznetsov's statement. I think indeed that all the representatives around this table will also agree. That does not mean, however, that the question of the number of inspections and seismic stations does not continue to form an essential part of our negotiations. There is no need to insist upon the difference between the concept of bargaining and that of negotiation, both in a diplomatic dictionary and in an ordinary dictionary. Success cannot be achieved in any negotiations by bargaining; but no fact which is material to a real agreement can be left outside the field of negotiations. Our delegation is convinced that negotiations are indispensable on all the terms of the agreement without exception, and provide the only method which can lead us to the achievement of the results to which we aspire and which we have a solemn duty to achieve.

We know that the distance between three inspections and seven is much greater than the three intervening levels would suggest. We also know - as the representatives at this Conference have often told us - that a quantitative modification in inspections can correspond to a qualitative modification. But it is equally true that all those who are not directly involved in the controversy consider - of course I can only speak for the delegation of Brazil - that some point of agreement must be found between these two positions independently of each, on the basis of all the technical and political factors involved, of which we have suggested a joint study.

While this study is in progress, we must not forget the examination (which, as I have said, can be parallel but not simultaneous) of the data concerning the size of the areas to be inspected, the number of members of the inspection teams, and other points which have to be solved. I listened with the greatest interest to Mr. Cavalletti's statement on this point(supra, pp.5-7).

Like the other representatives who have expounded their views here, we put out confidence in the work of our co-Chairmen and in the final success of this

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Conference. Indeed, if we did not have this confidence, we should have to return to the question which I asked at the beginning of my first statement, which was the main theme of Mrs. Myrdal's excellent speech (ENDC/PV.100, p.23), and which I should like to repeat now at the end of my remarks today. That question is: If we give up hope, what is the use of our presence here?

Mr. FOSTER (United States of America): First I should like to state that I welcome the remarks of the representatives of Italy and Brazil. I think that the comprehensive list of areas to be explored and developed set forth in Mr. Cavalletti's remarks constitutes a most useful guide for such exploration. My delegation will attempt to develop further many of the points to which he has referred, believing that they can contribute substantially to our progress here. I was very much interested also in the remarks of the representative of Brazil. I was particularly impressed by his suggestion of discussions in parallel - a point that we have felt to be indispensable if we are to make the kind of progress which I know each delegation believes essential, particularly with reference to that which is uppermost in many of our minds; a nuclear test ban treaty.

I appreciate also the comments concerning continued meetings of all types - plenary, private and otherwise - which we too believe can help us in the task before us. Dealing further with that point, I would say that, while there has been some prior informal discussion between the co-Chairmen regarding conference procedures, I should like to speak today as representative of the United States, and not as a co-Chairman, on the procedures of this Conference. It is important, as various delegations have pointed out, that our procedures should facilitate our work by being as orderly as possible. In previous sessions of this Conference we have had some success in that regard. It is the view of the United States delegation that we should continue with the procedures which have been agreed upon in the past.

As most delegations have recently indicated - and as was pointed out again this morning - the primary emphasis of this Conference at present must be upon the negotiation of a nuclear test ban treaty. Since the resumption of the Conference on 12 February we have devoted most of our attention to that question in these plenary meetings. We should continue to discuss it in plenary meetings until all delegations have had a chance to express their thoughts concerning it.

When that has been done, however, we believe it would be in order for us to resume the previously-agreed pattern of work of this Conference. Thus, we should in

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plenary meetings resume the discussion of general and complete disarmament, continuing through item 5 of the agreed plan of work (ENDC/52). As previously, that schedule would not preclude any delegation from raising in a plenary meeting any matter that it felt called upon to discuss. It would, however, enable us to move forward with discussion of the many important issues related to the general disarmament problem, a problem which we simply must not neglect. At the same time we should resume in the Committee of the Whole discussion of the measures appropriate for that body.

We believe that discussions in the Committee of the Whole should at this time proceed on the basis of parallel discussion of two items to be agreed upon by the co-Chairmen. That is the procedure which has been followed in the past. For its part, the United States would propose discussion of measures to reduce the risk of war by accident, miscalculation, or failure of communications. Parallel with discussion of that item, the United States delegation would be prepared to discuss either the Soviet proposal for a draft declaration on renunciation of the use of foreign territories for stationing strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons (ENDC/75), or the earlier Soviet item regarding the establishment of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the globe.

As I indicated in my statement at the opening meeting of this session, the United States believes that certain measures to reduce the risk of war are not only important but are measures on which it might not be too difficult to reach agreement.

The question of a nuclear test ban still appears to be uppermost in the minds of most representatives. The United States believes, as I indicated earlier, that after allowance of an appropriate period for all delegations to express their views on that question in plenary meetings, meetings of the nuclear Sub-Committee should be resumed. In that manner the nuclear Powers represented here can engage in careful and deliberate discussion of the specific issues remaining to be resolved if we are to achieve a test-ban treaty. The nuclear Sub-Committee would, of course, report frequently to this Conference, and its daily verbatim records would be available as usual to all delegations. In addition, as noted, any delegation would still be free to discuss the test-ban question here in plenary meeting; but the resumption of the meetings of the Sub-Committee could facilitate discussion of specific issues - some of them the type outlined by Mr. Cavalletti this morning - as distinct from somewhat more general items. In the opinion of the United States

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delegation, these procedural suggestions would facilitate progress in the negotiation of a nuclear test ban treaty, and at the same time would enable us to proceed with other important Conference work.

If, however, other members of the Conference have reservations about resuming now the previously-agreed schedule of work, the United States would not wish to interfere with the work of the Conference because of procedural difficulties. Therefore, if it be the consensus, we should be prepared to have the discussion of the three major areas of the work of the Conference carried on, for the time being at least, in the plenary discussions. Thus we could agree to discuss in plenary meeting, either daily or weekly, the nuclear test ban question, or the two agreed collateral measures, or the agreed agenda of stage I measures for general and complete disarmament. For each of those three major areas there should be assured adequate and reasonably prompt opportunity for appropriate discussion. At the same time we believe that, even under such an arrangement, primary emphasis must continue to be on a nuclear test ban in the immediately-forthcoming plenary meetings.

We should be prepared to discuss these procedural suggestions with our co-Chairman at his convenience, but I wished to raise them here so that we both might have the benefit of any suggestions from other delegations at this Conference.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): At the last meeting we heard the representative of the United States, Mr. Foster, who spoke on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. Mr. Foster's statement added nothing new to the position of the United States as we know it, although it was made after his return from the United States and, naturally, many delegations were hoping that he would bring back something new. The trend of that statement gives one the impression that the main concern of the United States delegation at present is not to reach agreement on putting an end to nuclear tests, but to seek for arguments in order somehow to justify the United States position preventing an agreement which has now been made possible by the Soviet Government's recent steps, which go a long way towards meeting the United States position.

In its previous statement the Soviet delegation has shown in detail that the national means of detection now at the disposal of States are adequate to ensure reliable control over compliance with an international agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. The facts adduced by the Soviet delegation have been

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supplemented by the statements made by other representatives. We should like to note in particular the important statements made by the representatives of Czechoslovakia, the United Arab Republic, Romania, Sweden, Poland and others. In some of these statements it was shown in particular how extensive the existing observation networks are, and how great are their capabilities for ensuring control over the cessation of nuclear tests.

If the Western Powers had not tried to ignore or even to discredit the existing state of things, an agreement would have been signed long ago. Only the refusal of the Western Powers, and of the United States in the first place, to accept what actually exists is the cause of the obstacles which are preventing the Committee from fulfilling its task of preparing an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests.

We are faced with a rather odd situation. For a number of years, in fact, all over the world - in Europe, America, Asia and other continents - nuclear explosions have been recorded without any difficulty; they are reliably identified and distinguished from natural earthquakes. Thus, in practice, control over nuclear explosions in all environments has been taking place for a long time already. This control is being carried out by national means for the detection and identification of nuclear explosions. It is obvious that this national control will continue to function in the future, whether or not an international agreement banning nuclear tests is concluded. But here we have an odd situation: no sooner do we come to the point of concluding a test ban treaty than the United States starts raising all sorts of groundless or patently-exaggerated doubts regarding the capabilities of control, and takes imaginary hypothetical difficulties for reality. This is precisely the way in which the United States is blocking all ways to an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear tests.

As the Soviet delegation has already stressed, the Soviet Government agreed to the carrying-out of two to three inspections in the Soviet Union, and to the installation of three automatic seismic stations on its territory, exclusively to help to clear the ground for an agreement. But I repeat once again that we see no real need for carrying out any inspections or for setting up automatic stations. The existing network of national observation posts would provide all the parties to a future agreement with adequate assurance that it was being carried out. Therefore, in taking the decision to meet the views of the Western Powers, we were not guided

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by any scientific or technical considerations, or by any fears that the existing means of control might be inadequate. We have no such fears. We were guided solely by political considerations to meet the views of the United States, in order to secure its agreement to a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapon tests. We made a great political concession to the Western Powers. This was a demonstration of great flexibility and goodwill on the part of the Soviet Government.

The concession made by the Soviet Union goes even farther than was considered necessary by the majority of States for the conclusion of an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. In this connexion it is appropriate to recall the memorandum of the eight non-aligned countries (ENDC/28), according to which it would be quite possible to conclude an agreement based on acceptance of the principle of inspection by invitation. It is well known that achievement of an agreement based on that memorandum was prevented by the attitude of the Western Powers. They rejected the principle of inspection by invitation and insisted on the principle of compulsory inspection. The Soviet Union has met also this desire of the Western Powers, and this was reflected in the recent messages of the Head of the Soviet Government, Mr. Khrushchev, to the President of the United States, Mr. Kennedy (ENDC/73).

It is not enough, however, to say that the Soviet Government met the desire of the Western side with regard to the principle of inspections. In fact it agreed to that number of inspections which the Western representatives themselves named not so long ago, during informal meetings with our representatives, as sufficient to satisfy the United States. We did not try to obtain something for ourselves by bargaining, but agreed to what had been named by the representatives of the Western Powers and would, they asserted, clear the way to agreement. If the Western side were to approach the present negotiations with the same resolve and principle, there would be no hindrance to the signing of an agreement.

However, they preferred to act differently. The United States backed down. Having obtained practically all that it desired and considered necessary for the conclusion of a treaty, it is now putting forward new conditions and formulating new demands in an attempt to get a few more concessions from the Soviet Union. Of course, this position of the United States can in no way be described as flexible, and can only be assessed as a bargaining position. The representative of Romania, Mr. Macovescu, observed very rightly that what is now going on in the Committee is a question not of arithmetic but of politics (ENDC/PV.102, p.6).

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Mr. Foster tried to represent the position of the United States as a flexible one. He even said that in certain circumstances the United States might agree to seven inspections a year on the territory of the Soviet Union instead of the eight to ten. But this is the most barefaced bargaining, not flexibility at all. Flexibility does not consist in speaking of eight to ten inspections yesterday, naming seven inspections today, and naming other figures tomorrow. Flexibility consists, not in creating obstacles to an agreement, but in facilitating it. But the United States is creating such difficulties with its bargaining attitude, because in fact it now refuses to accept what in the autumn of last year it had itself considered to be sufficient for concluding an agreement and even asked us to accept; yet now it is backing down and is doing so at the very time when the Soviet Union has met its desires - that is, the desires of the United States.

The United States has an opportunity to prove its flexibility, to confirm not by words but by deeds, that it is prepared to help forward the conclusion of an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. To this end it will not have to do anything that would be terribly great or difficult for the United States Government; all that is necessary is to revert to that number of annual inspections which was named by the representatives of the United States, and indeed by the representative of the United Kingdom, in the course of informal discussions and even at official meetings of the Committee, and which has now been accepted by the Soviet Union. That is now the crux of the matter.

I should now like to turn to the question of automatic seismic stations. As is well known, the question of automatic seismic stations was raised during negotiations for the cessation of nuclear weapon tests on the initiative of the Soviet Union. The proposal to install automatic seismic stations on the territories of the nuclear Powers was put forward in order to overcome the main obstacle to agreement, which was constituted by the demand of the United States side for international control and inspection for the purpose of verifying the cessation of underground nuclear tests on the territories of the nuclear Powers.

The point is that the Soviet Union, basing itself on the scientific achievements of recent years and on the very convincing practical results of detection and identification of nuclear explosions, firmly maintains the opinion that at the present time national means are sufficient for exercising control over compliance with an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. In the discussions the

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United States side has continually used the familiar argument, which we consider unsound, that for the United States the best guarantee against a possible violation of a nuclear test ban treaty would be the right to carry out on-site inspections, and nothing else. Everyone knows that the United States, by stubbornly adhering to this position, has blocked any possibility of progress in the negotiations and has led them into a blind alley.

Last Autumn the Soviet Government, with the utmost good will in seeking for ways to come to an agreement, submitted a proposal for the use of automatic seismic stations. As many of you may remember, this proposal was discussed in London last autumn at the tenth Pugwash Conference of scientists of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States. It was put forward by the scientists to help the nuclear Powers participating in the negotiations to overcome the difficulties which had arisen in the negotiations because of differences between the States in their attitude towards inspection. Since the United States representative stated in the negotiations for the cessation of nuclear weapon tests that they could not unreservedly trust and could not fully rely on national systems for the detection and identification of nuclear explosions, the Soviet Government proposed the use of automatic seismic stations on the territories of the nuclear Powers for the purpose of verifying the accurate functioning of each of the national systems of the nuclear Powers, in order to remove thereby that lack of confidence in the accuracy and effectiveness of the functioning of national systems to which the United States was continually referring and which was preventing the achievement of an agreement.

The Soviet Union had all the more grounds for hoping that this proposal would be acceptable to the United States Government since this idea was suggested by the United Kingdom scientists at the Pugwash Conference in London and because it met with definite understanding also on the part of the United States scientists participating in that Conference. In order to remove any possible suspicions which the other side might have in regard to the functioning of automatic seismic stations, the Soviet Government some time later even went so far as to agree that the conveyance of the instruments from the international centre to these stations and back should be carried out with the participation of foreign personnel, should the need for this arise, while precautionary measures would of course be taken against the use of such visits for intelligence activities. Thus the Soviet proposal for automatic seismic stations included certain elements of international control, which in itself represents a great act of good will by the Soviet Union.

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As we know, at first the United States attitude towards the Soviet proposal for automatic seismic stations was extremely cool and, we must say, even negative. It put forward a whole series of doubts and reservations and, at least during the first stage of the discussion of this proposal, showed no interest in it. This lack of interest in the proposal continued until the Soviet Union, as I have said before, agreed to conveyance of the instruments to the automatic seismic stations with the participation of foreign personnel, if need be. As soon as the Soviet Union supplemented its original proposal for automatic seismic stations with its agreement to the participation of foreign personnel in the conveyance of instruments from the international centre to the automatic seismic stations and back, the United States side immediately showed an interest in, and a relish for, this proposal. It got a great appetite for these automatic seismic stations, and the United States representatives began to demand the installation of the largest possible number of them on the territory of the Soviet Union.

In putting forward the proposal to install automatic seismic stations on the territories of the nuclear Powers, the Soviet Union based itself on the assumption that these stations could assure the side concerned that national systems for the detection and identification of nuclear explosions were functioning properly and without faults which might affect the efficiency of control. That is precisely the point and purpose of the use of automatic seismic stations. That is precisely the reason why the Soviet Union put forward that proposal.

Soviet scientists consider that, in order to verify the functioning of national networks for the detection and identification of nuclear explosions, it is quite enough to install three such stations on the territory of the Soviet Union and three on the territory of the United States, of course after selecting the most suitable sites. Unfortunately the United States, in an attempt to justify in some way its claims for an increased number of automatic seismic stations, began to put forward a different idea regarding the use of these stations. It began to talk about using them to increase the capabilities of the detection system as a whole, so as to reduce the number of suspicious seismic events by identifying them as earthquakes.

Quite recently, on 12 February, the United States representative, Mr. Foster, tried to introduce some confusion into a question which, one would have thought, had already been resolved: that of the system of control over compliance with an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests (ENDC/PV.96, pp.10, 11). The Soviet Union considers that such control should be based on national systems for the detection and identification of nuclear explosions.

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That is also the gist of the proposal contained in the Joint Memorandum of the eight non-aligned States of 16 April 1962 (ENDC/28). It seemed as though the United States also had agreed to this. However, at the meeting I have just mentioned, Mr. Foster tried to depict the matter quite differently. He began to speak as though we had already agreed that the control system should consist of three elements: first, national detection and identification networks; secondly, automatic seismic stations; and thirdly, on-site inspection.

It might perhaps be possible to agree to such a breakdown into three elements, although this does not accurately reproduce the essence of our negotiations on this subject. But what arouses objections and disagreement on our part is Mr. Foster's assertion that automatic seismic stations would be installed as an adjunct to national detection and identification networks, and that automatic seismic stations would supplement the data collected by national stations.

We do not see that the purpose of automatic seismic stations consists in that; but, as I have said before, it consists in verifying the proper functioning of national networks for the detection and identification of nuclear explosions. These are two quite different matters. In order to fulfil this purpose - that is to say, to verify the proper functioning of national detection networks - there is no need for a large number of stations. For this purpose it will suffice to install three automatic seismic stations on the territory of the United States and three on the territory of the Soviet Union.

Soviet scientists consider that the installation of more than three automatic stations would do absolutely nothing more to verify the proper functioning of national networks for the detection and identification of nuclear explosions. Therefore the United States demand for more than three seismic stations is not justified by the needs. It is true that we have had some encouraging indications that the United States seems to be beginning to move in the right direction. Whereas on 12 February Mr. Foster regarded automatic seismic stations as an element of the control system carrying out, parallel with national control systems, the functions of detecting, locating and identifying seismic events, ten days later, on 22 February, Mr. Stelle said in the Eighteen-Nation Committee:

(continued in English)

"Now, it is clear that there is no issue between us on a system which puts its basic reliance on nationally-manned detection systems." (ENDC/PV.101, p.42)

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

(continued in Russian)

At the same time Mr. Stelle said:

(continued in English)

"Most recently we have agreed to place our reliance on national systems checked by various kinds of instrumentation, and without international supervision. So there is no issue on this ..." (ibid.)

(continued in Russian)

But if the United States places its reliance on national control systems, as Mr. Stelle stated quite clearly and definitely at the one hundred and first meeting, then we, for our part, should like to note with satisfaction this move forward by the United States, a move in the right direction. This understanding and evaluation of the role of national systems coincides with ours. Consequently we could put on record the general understanding that the United States agrees that national means of detection should be the basis of control over an agreement on the prohibition of underground nuclear tests. Moreover we understand, that the United States agrees that automatic seismic stations would be a means of verifying the proper functioning of national seismic stations.

Those were precisely the considerations which guided the Soviet Government when it suggested using the idea of installing automatic seismic stations which was put forward at the Pugwash Conference of scientists. We should like to stress very clearly that automatic seismic stations placed at three points - which apparently have already been agreed upon - in the territory of the Soviet Union and in the territory of the United States, in conjunction with other seismic stations in the territories of States bordering on the seismic zones of the Soviet Union and the United States, would constitute adequate means for dispelling any possible doubts felt by the other side concerning the proper functioning of national networks of seismic stations. On the basis of the statements of Mr. Stelle which I have quoted, it may be concluded that we can now agree without difficulty on the question of the number of automatic seismic stations, since after Mr. Stelle's statements the United States demand to increase the number of seismic stations above three falls away and becomes pointless.

Other questions which have been raised in the statements of other representatives, particularly at today's meeting, we reserve the right to revert to later after a careful examination and study of the records.

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): Speaking as representative of the United Kingdom, I would say that I have listened with care to the various interventions this morning; and I should like to say at the outset that I thought our Italian colleague gave us a good deal of help in our consideration of the problem of a nuclear test ban treaty by his enumeration of the various issues. The fact that he has collected them together in that way must be of help to us in our work. I think that to see the issues brought together shows us more clearly than could any words of mine just how varied the problem is. We have tended in recent meetings to concentrate on one or two particular issues; and it is natural that we should have done so, because those are the issues which appear at the moment to be creating the greatest difficulty. However, as I think my own colleague, Sir Paul Mason, said at the last meeting of the Committee, those other issues have to be faced; and when one sees them collected together in the way in which our Italian colleague has collected them, they do stress the size of the problem.

It is perfectly true that in previous negotiations, extending over a long period, many of those areas have been formulated in such a way as to bring about substantial agreement; but, of course, that has been changed in some aspects by the different positions the two sides have taken up. In the draft treaty which the United States and the United Kingdom submitted in April 1961 (ENDC/9) we tried to draw together a great deal of agreement that had then been reached; but much of that has been overtaken by events, and we may well have again to consider some of those matters together to make sure that agreement still remains. I think that we could in some forum or other usefully discuss various of those matters, while still seeking to bring the maximum pressure to bear on the key issues where we know the greatest difficulty exists.

My own delegation has consistently over the last eleven months sought to encourage our Soviet colleagues to discuss with us some of those other matters, and to reach agreement on them. Indeed, I think my own theme at this Conference, as my colleagues will recollect, has been that if we find difficulty in certain areas we should first discuss those areas where we can get the greatest agreement; because I have always believed that by building on some measure of agreement we can succeed in the wider issues as well, so that I think that it is helpful for us to have those points before us.

(The Chairman, United Kingdom)

It may well be that the suggestion on procedure made by our United States colleague, and his suggestion that we should reconvene the Sub-Committee at the earliest possible moment, would be useful particularly in this connexion, as many of the points of detail are obvious ones which could better be discussed in a relatively small meeting. I say that without wishing to exclude anyone from participation in the discussion of these important matters.

Our Brazilian colleague, as always, delighted us with the felicity of his language. I often envy him the phrases which he puts before us, and I was particularly struck this morning when he reminded us that the differences between the two sides on the test-ban issue were irreducible but that although irreducible they were slight, and went on to say that they "are serious because irreducible, but not irreducible because they are serious". (supra, p.10). I think that does dramatize for us the position as it is; and the fact that the positions are so close will, I hope, lead us all to be convinced that they cannot be, and must not be, irreducible. I think that is the point where we ought at this particular moment to have some element of patience.

This morning our Soviet colleague, in a speech to which I shall come back in a moment, commented that he was surprised that our United States colleague had not come back with new instructions. I would only deduce from that remark that he is very clear in his mind that his own colleague, Mr. Kuznetsov, will be coming back with new and more flexible instructions at an early date. If that is a correct assumption to draw from his remark, I welcome it warmly. Let us hope that in this particular field we shall be seeing a welcome move forward by the Soviet Union in the very near future.

On the general question of procedure, our United States colleague has put before us thoughts about the way we could best proceed; and I would in large measure like to endorse what he said and to point to the need to resume discussion on some of those other matters to which he drew attention - not in any way seeking to eliminate discussion on the nuclear test issue, but simply taking account of the fact that our last meeting rose before the normal scheduled time and that today there were very few speakers on the list. It would seem that the majority of delegations feel at the moment that they have nothing particular to add on the subject of nuclear tests in public discussion.

It is true that today we have heard several references to private discussion. My colleagues will know that I have always recommended the maximum amount of private

(The Chairman, United Kingdom)

discussion, and at this moment of time it would seem that delegations are not anxious to make a great many speeches on the subject. However, we have those other very important matters before us, and if it is the general will I would warmly endorse the suggestion that we should get discussion going again in plenary meetings on some of them, at the same time leaving it possible to revert to the problem of nuclear tests at any time it is wished. I hope our co-Chairmen will get together again on that and put before us a workmanlike programme so that we may know exactly what subjects we are going to devote our attention to in the immediate future.

Coming to the speech of our Soviet colleague this morning, I must admit that I was depressed to find that he was again following the line that Mr. Kuznetsov took in his speech to us last Friday (ENDC/PV.101, pp. 19 et seq), a line which seemed to me to be negative in every way and to concern itself far more with justifying past Soviet positions than with seeking progress towards agreement between the two sides. I think what we have to do is to use all our energies in seeking agreement. As I said earlier, whether it be in small matters or in large that is what we have to do.

However, I must take up one or two points he has made in order to show at least that I cannot find myself in agreement with him in regard to them. He told us in the early part of his remarks that the Soviet Union had shown in detail that national systems of detection were sufficient. He claimed, and Mr. Kuznetsov has claimed in the past, that they have shown this; but in fact they have not. That is one of the real difficulties. Whenever we have invited our Soviet colleagues to put before us the evidence they claim to have, they have always been extremely reluctant to do so, and have relied largely on quotations from Western newspapers. As every representative around this table knows, if one chooses to be selective in the quotations one takes from Western newspapers, one can certainly give an impression which is not borne out by the facts.

The Soviet representative made this claim, and then went on to say that for a number of years the Soviet Union had without difficulty recorded all nuclear explosions, and that those nuclear explosions had been recorded throughout the world. Of course, that does not mean to say that all nuclear explosions underground have been recorded. Indeed, that is one of the problems before us, inasmuch as we do not know at this moment whether any underground testing is going on in the

(The Chairman, United Kingdom)

territory of the Soviet Union. We have no means of knowing that there is none at all. We do know when underground testing is undertaken by the West, because it is publicly stated; but no such statements are issued by the Soviet Union.

It may be recalled that on 10 February 1962 the Soviet Union did in fact carry out one underground test which was detected outside its territory. The Soviet Union later admitted that that test had in fact taken place; but we have no reason to believe that if it had not been detected outside the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union would in fact have acknowledged that it had taken place. The fact that one test has taken place which has been detected and identified outside and has later been admitted does not mean that it is the only one. We have no means of knowing whether it is the only one or not. I think it is only right that we should put that fact before our colleagues so as to place the matter in its proper perspective.

I would recall the attention of my colleagues to a statement on this point made by the then leader of the United States delegation, Mr. Dean, in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly on 26 October 1962 when he said:

"Although it is a well-publicized fact that stations in other countries have recorded certain - and I repeat, certain - of our underground nuclear explosions, there have been many other explosions which have not been identified as nuclear explosions and, in fact, have not even been detected simply not detected - by scientific stations and observatories outside the United States. And this is true despite the fact that we have made public announcements of the occurrence of underground explosions at the Nevada test site and in several cases have given the precise time of the explosions. But despite this fact some of these explosions have not been detected by stations outside the United States.

"Let me repeat again what I just said. The United States has conducted many underground nuclear explosions which were not even detected - let alone identified." (A/C.1/PV.1255, p.26)

I give that quotation merely in refutation of the claim which our Soviet colleagues so often make in regard to this matter.

The Western position is quite clear on this. It is that, according to our own knowledge, it is not possible to detect and identify all these underground explosions; but that if our Soviet colleagues in fact say it is then all we ask them to do is to provide us with the concrete evidence that it is and not merely

(The Chairman, United Kingdom)

make sweeping claims here that they have in fact shown it to be the case. That sort of thing does not help us forward at all in our work.

Our Soviet colleague went on this morning to say once more that the Soviet Union not only had re-accepted the principle of on-site inspection, but had accepted the number suggested by the West. I have paid tribute to our Soviet colleagues for their re-acceptance of the principle of on-site inspection. I realize the difficulty that was presented to them after what they had said to us in the past, and I welcome what they have done. But I just do not understand why they need to mar such a move forward by this constant repetition of what has been repudiated and shown to be incorrect. They have not accepted the number suggested by the West. They have tried to justify that claim in various ways; but I am sure that the consensus in this Conference is quite clear that the position of the West on this matter has never been in doubt and that mere reiteration of the Soviet claim is not helpful to our work. I ask our Soviet colleagues not to spend our time in going over their claim once again, which really does not help us forward at all. The position of the West has been made abundantly clear in this connexion, and I think there is no need to add to that.

Then the Soviet representative went on to a very strange argument, which I frankly did not and do not understand. He said that the Western position was certainly not flexible, and that to offer a new figure of seven on-site inspections was not a sign of flexibility. He then said that true flexibility meant seeking to facilitate agreement. I agree entirely with that, but I am not quite clear how he defines it in relation to the Soviet Union. If he has some better way of seeking to facilitate agreement, if he has some way of bringing the two positions closer together with an element of concession on both sides, then I shall be only too glad to hear from him. However, when he says that one is not being flexible when one is seeking to come nearer to the position of the other negotiating party, I just do not understand the meaning of what he says to us. I hope that our Soviet colleagues will show themselves flexible and will in fact make a definite move further to meet the Western position.

The Western position, of course, is quite clear in that it is based on the best scientific evaluation available to us. It is based, of course, to some degree on a political approach, because the very fact of the acceptance of a quota is a political decision, just as the determination to make a particular inspection from

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a quota must also be a political decision; but the basis on which this has been evaluated is a scientific basis of the number of events which we believe still to be unidentifiable in a particular region. It is on that basis, and on the assumption that there must be a reasonable quota of on-site inspections, that this matter is evaluated. So of course both political decisions and scientific evaluations come in here; but the political decision must be one which is seen to be realistic when evaluated in scientific terms.

I say to our Soviet colleague that, so far as the West is concerned, there must be that realistic scientific evaluation as a basis for any agreement which we reach. If our Soviet colleagues tell us that for them it is purely a political approach, then I would only remind them, as I did in a previous statement, that if it is purely political it should clearly be easier for them to move than it is for the West, because they have only this one determination to make, which is a political determination. If, in fact, they have made a political determination which brings them to the extent of re-accepting something they said they could not accept before - re-accepting the principle of compulsory on-site inspection, and re-accepting it to the tune of three on-site inspections a year - then I fail entirely to see why the same political background does not impel them to make a further move; because, having accepted the principle politically, I should have thought it was not difficult for them to accept a number which was still relatively small and which ought not to embarrass them in any material degree. Most certainly the number of three on-site inspections does not embarrass them from the point of view they have put forward many times here in the past: the point of view that it brings risk of espionage, surely a small addition to that number certainly does not embarrass them either. Therefore the number which the West has put forward I should have thought was not a difficult figure for the Soviet Union to accept.

Our Soviet colleague then went on to deal with the question of automatic stations, and once again he reminded us that it was raised at the Pugwash Conference in England last year. Once again he insisted on telling us that it was put forward by British scientists. I never quite understand why he insists on seeking to give a credit to my countrymen which we do not claim for ourselves. We are, of course, a modest nation; that is well known. But on this occasion I must repeat our modesty in saying that we do not accept this particular claim. On a previous occasion, in order to clarify the issue, I did take the trouble of circulating to

(The Chairman, United Kingdom)

my colleagues in document ENDC/66 of 4 December 1962 the actual text which was prepared at rugwash and was in fact signed by three United States and three Soviet scientists. The Soviet scientists were Mr. Artsimovitch, Mr. Riznichenko and Mr. Tamm. Those are the people, if anyone, who should have the credit, and I do not know whether, in fact, British scientists were even consulted in relation to it. This was a co-Chairmen effort if ever there was one, it seems to me, and our Soviet and United States colleagues dealt with it. So I merely correct the record yet once more, and in doing so point out that our Soviet colleagues do rather tend to seek, by reiteration of something they have stated before, to get it accepted as fact. I put that forward because it is something they do in other fields, perhaps where it is more important than it is on this particular issue.

However, on this whole question of automatic seismic stations Mr. Tsarapkin said to us again today, rather on the same lines as his colleague did last Friday, that the West showed no interest in the proposal and so the Soviet Union proposed that the records should be taken in and out by international personnel. I do not know why he should deduce anything in particular from that. I should have thought that, if an automatic station is to be effective and to provide a check, then, accepting the fact that suspicion exists in the world today, as it does on both sides, it is not unreasonable to expect that, in order to carry out the function envisaged in the proposal, international personnel should be used. Does that statement from our Soviet colleagues seek to imply - it was not stated - that the West would try to utilize international personnel for some improper purpose? That certainly is not our intention. If it is being implied, it should be stated explicitly, because I think it is a most improper suggestion to make and one which I myself very much regret.

But in any case I have indicated why I believe it is appropriate that international personnel should be used, and here one comes down to numbers again. The Soviet Union said that the West had then asked for the greatest possible number. In fact, what is actually being suggested is seven, which does not seem to me to be an enormous number considering the area of the Soviet Union. It has been suggested as a number which would be really helpful both in providing a check on national systems, which I think is important, and in seeking to give additional information for identification as well as detection of events.

(The Chairman, United Kingdom)

This morning our Soviet colleague drew a distinction here and claimed that the Soviet Union was disturbed at the idea that these automatic stations should do anything other than provide a check on national stations. He did not explain to us why he is opposed to their assisting in identification techniques. I should have thought that anything that assisted in identifying those remaining unidentified events would be helpful to us all, because as the extent to which one can identify them increases, the requirement for on-site inspections must be correspondingly reduced; and if one could identify them all with certainty, the problem would not occur at all. But if Mr. Tsarapkin is saying he does not want to assist in identifying them, then I am distinctly puzzled, and I do not understand why, when once put up, an automatic station, which would be quite an expensive, complicated structure, should not be used to the maximum advantage. And here I mean to the maximum advantage not of one country - certainly not - but of dealing with and solving the whole problem. Therefore I am frankly quite puzzled at this distinction he draws and the restriction which he seems to seek to impose.

But, over-all, I am discouraged by the speech we listened to from our Soviet colleague because it seems to me he was seeking, as I said at the opening of my remarks, more to justify a position than to find ways forward. My own hope is that we may find ways forward. I really felt it necessary to make these comments in relation to his speech in order to correct any misapprehensions that there might be. I believe we must continue to seek solutions to these key problems where the maximum interest lies at the moment, these key questions of numbers. We must seek also to smooth out the other problems; and here, as I indicated earlier, the list provided by our Italian colleague is helpful. We should think very seriously about the procedure proposals put forward by our United States colleague this morning. I hope we can move forward and try to further our work both on this subject and on the other very important subjects which face us at the present time. That is all I wish to say as representative of the United Kingdom.

Mr. LALL (India): After lengthy consideration of the situation in which we now find ourselves, I should like to make a few brief remarks today. I do not want to go directly into the substance of all the most interesting and valuable statements made in the course of this morning's meeting; but I should like to suggest to our co-Chairmen in particular that it seems to us increasingly clear that there is now evidence of a spirit of negotiation regarding the test ban issue.

(Mr. Lall, India)

We do not take the view that our Conference is in a state of stagnation on this issue at all. If we look at the position today and compare it with the position in which we were placed before we went away for a recess towards the end of December, we will see that there has been very considerable movement. At that time the stated position of the Western side was twelve to twenty obligatory on-site inspections a year, although there had been - I think I am right in saying - indications that the figure, even at that stage, was not an immutable one. On the other hand, the position of our Soviet colleagues was that in no circumstances could they agree to any obligatory on-site inspection. Also they took the view that national means of detection were completely adequate for the situation, whereas I believe that on the Western side there was some doubt about that too.

Since then we have witnessed the very important move forward -- which all of us have greatly appreciated -- contained in Mr. Khrushchev's letter dated 19 December 1962 (ENDC/73), by which the Soviet Union was prepared to agree to on-site inspections on two or three occasions per year. That was indeed a tremendous change from the situation in which we found ourselves at the end of our last session before we recessed towards the end of December. And then we witnessed that the United States and the United Kingdom dropped their figure of twelve to twenty down to eight to ten; and that figure has now been further dropped to seven. That is what Mr. Foster told us in his intervention on 25 February (ENDC/PV.102, p.24).

Today Mr. Tsarapkin told us that, on analysis of Mr. Stelle's remarks about the national detection system, he felt that common ground was emerging on that issue. You, Mr. Chairman, took up that point yourself a little, and wondered by Mr. Tsarapkin drew certain distinctions between the assistance which would be provided by automatic seismic stations not only in verification of the national means of detection but also as a supplement to them, as it were. Putting that point aside, I would certainly tend to agree with you that whatever the automatic seismic stations throw up in the way of evidence - whether it is evidence in confirmation of what had been shown in the national stations, or whether it is interesting evidence of a seismological nature in itself, intrinsically - will naturally be valuable to the international commission. But the point I want to stress is that our colleague Mr. Tsarapkin found an emergence of common ground with the United States in regard to these national detection systems. That, I would suggest, is again an indication that the spirit of negotiation is appearing on the two sides.

(Mr. Lall, India)

Coming to the question of the actual numbers of on-site inspections, you, Mr. Chairman, said today, I believe, that there must be an element of concession on both sides. "On both sides", you said. That again, I suggest, is very much in keeping with a spirit of negotiation.

We took note also that you said that of course a quota of on-site inspections is in its very nature a political decision. But you stressed the other aspect which the Western countries have mentioned: that the basis of the quota, in your view, is scientific. What interested me in that particular aspect of your statement was that it put in juxtaposition both your position - a scientific basis for a quota - and the Soviet position, which is that this is a political decision. Again I felt that that approach was one in which common ground could be found - that you were willing to take into account that the Soviet Union regards this issue as political, though of course you stressed your own point of view. So, from the statements which have been made - the statements of both the co-Chairmen and the statement which you, Mr. Chairman, have made today - we do feel that a process of negotiation has started.

I should like to draw attention to one other point in this connexion. It is contained in the statement which Mr. Foster made on 25 February when he told us about his talk with Mr. Kuznetsov. He said:

"In that talk I explained the United States position on a number of features of the inspection system it envisaged. I shall describe them to the Conference in the near future. I also told Mr. Kuznetsov that, in the context of the verification framework I had described, the United States could accept as an annual quota for each side seven on-site inspections." (ENDC/PV.102, p.24)

The point which caught my attention there was that Mr. Foster had talked to Mr. Kuznetsov about various features of the inspection system as the United States envisaged it. There is no indication that Mr. Kuznetsov said anything in reply, but the fact that the co-Chairmen have started mentioning these things is, we believe, in line with the development of an atmosphere of negotiation. And although we take note that Mr. Tsarapkin has said today that he would have nothing to do with bargaining, he has clearly said that he will have everything to do with the facilitating of an agreement. We interpret that to mean that Mr. Tsarapkin and his colleagues will have everything to do with the promotion of true negotiation - as they see it, certainly; but we have ample evidence that the Soviet Union knows

(Mr. Lall, India)

that negotiation is for the purpose of reaching agreement. Negotiation is not a technique which is entered into by any country for its own sake. Negotiation is not an end in itself. Negotiation is entered upon for the purpose of reaching agreement. Therefore we were very heartened at that aspect of Mr. Tsarapkin's statement - that what the Soviet Union is after is the facilitating of agreement.

In these circumstances I should like, if I may, to differ slightly from you, Mr. Chairman, in the matter of the interest or lack of interest in this Committee in the issue of a test ban. You were, of course, right in drawing attention to the fact that not many speakers were listed today. But there were not many speakers listed because, perhaps, representatives today were waiting for certain utterances from certain quarters. It may be that those utterances have now taken place in a certain measure.

We will study very carefully the remarks of Mr. Tsarapkin; and, though the United States co-Chairman talked on procedure today, which we very much welcome, we heard an important statement from him on 25 February; and perhaps we shall hear more statements from him on the test ban in the near future. I would simply suggest this: that it would, I think, not be entirely correct to take a slight drop in the number of speakers on this subject as indicating any lack of interest in the issue of a test ban among the countries assembled here. This is now a very crucial issue. It is an issue on which a great deal of attention has been focused; and, while we are here for other purposes too, and while those purposes must proceed, we should not in any sense give any impression of abandoning the issue of the test ban, because that is the primary goal which must be achieved at this stage of our negotiations around this table.

Before I close, therefore, I should like again to make this suggestion to the co-Chairmen. We are not saying that this should be the next phase of our discussions, but we request them - when they deem it appropriate, and in order to promote further the spirit of negotiation which we think is appearing, perhaps rather shyly, on this issue of a test ban and on the final matters which remain to be resolved - to consider holding at least one informal meeting which might help us to raise certain questions with both sides in an informal manner and thereby seek clarification which, by its very process, might help to open the doors to a fuller process of negotiation.

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): I should like to make one immediate comment on one aspect of that interesting intervention. If I gave any impression that I thought there was a lack of interest, that was not my meaning at all. People can

(The Chairman, United Kingdom)

frequently have very great interest in a matter without wanting to make a speech about it, and I am sure that my Indian colleague can think of many occasions when that is so. If I gave that impression, I am glad he has corrected it, because my feeling was not that there was lack of interest but that, if people did not wish to make speeches on that subject at this time, we should not deprive ourselves of the pleasure of listening to one another on other subjects.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its one hundred and third plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the Chairmanship of Mr. J.B. Godber, representative of the United Kingdom.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Italy, Brazil, the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and India.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Friday, 1 March 1963, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.40 p.m.